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JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal taken from an order of the Third 
Judicial District Court for Salt Lake County over which the 
Utah Court of Appeals does not have original appellate 
jurisdiction. Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 78-2-2(3) (j) the 
Supreme Court has original jurisdiction of this appeal. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-19(l) the Defendant 
Appellant is entitled to bring this appeal as a matter of 
right. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
Whether Judge Hanson's factual finding that the 
appellees ("Uninsureds") were prejudiced by the active 
participation of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") 
in the Uninsureds litigation to recover health insurance 
benefits is clearly against the weight of the evidence? 
Whether Judge Hanson applied the correct standard 
of law in ruling that the active participation of BCBSU in 
litigation constituted a waiver of the right to arbitration 
when BCBSU1s participation resulted in prejudice to the 
Uninsureds? 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Section 3 of The Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-313-3, gave Judge Hanson authority to set aside any 
arbitration agreement upon grounds existing at law or equity: 
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A written agreement to submit any existing or 
future controversy to arbitration is valid, 
enforceable, and irrevocable, except upon 
grounds existing at law or equity to set aside 
the agreement, or when fraud is alleged as 
provided in the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Section 4(1) of The Utah Arbitration Act, Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) authorized Judge Hanson to make 
appropriate determinations regarding the existence, validity 
and enforceability of BCBSU's alleged arbitration agreement: 
(1) The court, upon motion of any party 
showing the existence of an arbitration 
agreement, shall order the parties to 
arbitrate. If an issue is raised concerning 
the existence of an arbitration agreement or 
the scope of the matters covered by the 
agreement, the court shall determine those 
issues and order or deny arbitration 
accordingly. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
BCBSU appeals from Judge Hanson's order setting 
aside an alleged arbitration agreement between BCBSU and the 
Uninsureds on the equitable ground of waiver and following a 
factual finding that the active participation of BCBSU in the 
Uninsureds litigation to recover health insurance benefits 
prejudiced the Uninsureds. Because the Uninsureds, or 
members of their families, are experiencing serious illnesses 
for which they have no or wholly inadequate health insurance 
coverage, there is great urgency in their quest for relief. 
Judge Hanson applied the correct standard of law in ruling 
that the confusion, expense and delay caused by the active 
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participation of BCBSU in litigation during a seven month 
delay in asserting the right to arbitrate resulted in 
prejudice to the Uninsureds and a waiver of BCBSU's alleged 
right to arbitrate. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
1. Uninsureds are 11 separately employed dentists 
and members of the Utah Dental Association ("UDA") who are 
attempting to recover health insurance benefits for serious 
illnesses in their families, including but not limited to 
paraplegia, leukemia, breast cancer, brain cancer, chronic 
liver disease, bipolar depression, heart disease, hip joint 
disease, adult respiratory distress syndrome and cerebral 
palsy. (Affidavits of Uninsureds, R. at 521-534 and 
608-617). 
2. Prior to July of 1987 Uninsureds and their 
families had health insurance benefits for these and other 
illnesses under individual contracts with BCBSU, which 
guaranteed that such benefits would not be terminated by 
reason of their health. (R. at 521-534, 608-617 and 636). 
3. Prior to July of 1987 the UDA endorsed BCBSU 
as the health insurance plan of choice for its members and 
encouraged Uninsureds and all other UDA members to obtain 
their health insurance benefits through BCBSU. (R. at 5-7). 
4. In July of 1987 the UDA cancelled its 
endorsement of BCBSU and began encouraging the Uninsureds and 
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other members of the UDA to obtain health insurance benefits 
with the Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company. 
Uninsureds were told that Massachusetts Mutual would provide 
them and other UDA members with health insurance benefits as 
good as or better than their BCBSU coverge. (R. at 5-9). 
5. When BCBSU discovered that the UDA was no 
longer endorsing its health insurance plan it immediately 
notified Uninsureds and all other UDA participants that 
health insurance benefits would terminate, effective November 
1, 1987. Thereafter, Massachusetts Mutual refused to provide 
health insurance benefits to Uninsureds and members of their 
families who were seriously ill. (R. at 5-9). 
6. Uninsureds, or members of their families have 
serious illnesses or physical impairments that make it 
impossible for them to obtain health insurance benefits 
comparable to those available under the BCBSU plan. Because 
of these illnesses many of the Uninsureds will never be able 
to obtain health insurance coverage for the chronic and 
serious illnesses that they experience. (R. at 5-9, 521-534 
and 608-617) . 
7. In November of 1987 Uninsureds brought legal 
action against Massachusetts Mutual, two Massachusetts Mutual 
agents and the UDA. BCBSU was not originally named as a 
defendant because it was felt that there was not a good faith 
basis for claiming that BCBSU had terminated the Uninsureds' 
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health insurance contracts because of their serious 
illnesses. (R. at 2-10). 
8. As discovery commenced the named defendants 
began pointing their fingers at BCBSU. During August 1988 
the deposition of BCBSU plan administrator, Richard West was 
taken. (Stipulation in Appendix). 
9. On September 13, 1988, Uninsureds informed 
counsel for BCBSU that because of the information obtained in 
Mr. West's deposition they would amend their complaint to 
name BCBSU as an additional defendant. On September 20, 
1988, pursuant to request from BCBSU's litigation counsel, an 
amended notice of the continuing deposition of Richard West 
was sent to litigation counsel for BCBSU. (R. at 184). 
10. On September 27, 1988, BCBSU requested that 
the depositions of Tom Roman, Laura Dieterle and Lynn 
Schisser, previously scheduled for October 21, be continued 
so that BCBSU's litigation counsel could be present. These 
depositions were so continued. (R. at 186). 
11. On November 2, 1988 litigation counsel for 
BCBSU accepted service of the Uninsureds' Second Amended 
Complaint. (R. at 248). 
12. On November 22, 1988 BCBSU answered the 
Uninsureds Second Amended Complaint raising seventeen 
defenses but making no mention of the existence of an 
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arbitration agreement or of any perceived right to 
arbitration. (R. at 252). 
13. On November 22, 1988 BCBSU filed cross claims 
against the UDA, Massachusetts Mutual and agents Henderson 
and Sholy, alleging the right to indemnity, proportionment of 
liability and attorneys fees. (R. at 252). 
14. On December 12, 1988 Uninsureds began 
preparing their case against BCBSU by serving their First 
Request For Production of Documents. (R. at 312). 
15. On December 12, 1988 UDA answered BCBSU1s 
crossclaims. (R. at 298). 
16. On December 21, 1988 BCBSU participated in the 
deposition of Lynn Schisser in Springfield, Massachusetts. 
(R. at 456) . 
17. On December 21, 1988, BCBSU participated in 
the deposition of Laura Dieterle in Springfield, 
Massachusetts. (R. at 456 and Stipulation in Appendix). 
18. On December 22, 1988 BCBSU participated in the 
deposition of Tom Roman in Springfield, Massachusetts. 
(R. at 456 and Stipulation in Appendix). 
19. On December 30, 1988 Uninsureds requested a 
Rule 30(b)(6) designation of corporate spokesman from BCBSU 
in conjunction with noticing up the deposition of BCBSU Vice 
President, Jack Schiess. (R. at 319). 
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20. On January 18, 1989 Uninsureds noticed up the 
deposition of Massachusetts Mutual general*agent Larry Hanks 
at a time convenient to BCBSU. (R. at 327). 
21. On January 23, 1989, BCBSU designated Jack 
Schiess as its Rule 30(b)(6) corporate spokesman. (R. at 
341). 
22. On January 23, 1989 BCBSU filed notice of its 
substitution of David Money for earlier counsel Lee Curtis. 
(R. at 332). 
23. On January 23, 1989 BCBSU responded to 
Uninsureds First Set Of Interrogatories and First and Second 
Requests for Production of Documents. (R. at 335 & 337). 
24. On February 2, 1989 BCBSU participated in the 
deposition of its own Vice President, Jack Schiess. 
(Stipulation in Appendix). 
25. On February 2, 1989 BCBSU circulated a 
stipulation for a protective order among all parties. (BCBSU 
statement of facts at 15). 
26. On February 6, 1989 Uninsureds requested a 
trial setting and management conference. (R. 344). 
27. On February 8, 1989 the UDA submitted its 
First Set of Interrogatories to BCBSU. (R. at 346). 
28. On February 24, 1989 BCBSU participated in the 
deposition of Massachusetts Mutual general agent, Larry 
Hanks. (Stipulation in Appendix). 
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29. On March 9, 1988 Uninsureds finalized document 
preparation for their case against BCBSU by serving a Third 
Request For Production of Documents upon BCBSU. (R. at 359). 
30. On March 10, 1989 BCBSU served interrogatories 
and a request for production of documents upon the Uninsureds 
and Uninsureds began preparing their response. (R. at 368 
and BCBSU Statement of Facts at 14). 
31. On March 21, 1989 Massachusetts Mutual 
answered BCBSU crossclaims. (R. at 371). 
32. On March 30, 1989 BCBSU responded to the UDA's 
First Set of Interrogatories raising, for the first time an 
alleged right to arbitrate the dispute under S 78-31a-l but 
nevertheless, going on to raise objections to specific 
questions and to provide answers to interrogatories. (R. at 
381). 
33. On April 6, 1989 Uninsureds filed a request 
for ruling on their petition for a management conference and 
trial setting. (R. at 404). 
34. On April 7, 1989 BCBSU filed a Motion To 
Compel Arbitration and Stay Proceedings. Not until after 
this motion was filed did BCBSU inform Uninsureds that they 
would not be compelled to fully respond to BCBSU1s discovery 
requests which had already been substantially prepared. (R. 
at 450) . 
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35. On August 28, 1989 Judge Timothy R. Hanson 
heard oral argument on the BCBSU Motion To Compel 
Arbitration. (R. at 672). 
36. On November 14, 1989 Judge Hanson issued a 
Memorandum Decision denying BCBSU's Motion To Compel 
Arbitration and finding that BCBSU had "actively participated 
in the litigation process" and that such participation had 
"been to the extent that arbitration would work a substantial 
prejudice on the remaining parties". (R. at 709). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
Judge Hanson's findings of active participation in 
the litigation by BCBSU and resulting prejudice to the 
Uninsureds are findings of fact made in equity pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3. This Court should not disturb 
those findings unless clearly against the weight of the 
evidence. 
There is abundant evidence in the record to support 
the finding that BCBSU actively participated in the 
litigation. In many jurisdictions, testing the judicial 
waters to the extent that BCBSU has done constitutes an 
automatic waiver of the right to arbitrate with no specific 
finding of prejudice. Because of the serious illnesses 
suffered by the families of each of the 11 Uninsureds, any 
delay in obtaining insurance coverage or damages from which 
necessary medical care and treatment can be obtained is 
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significant. As a result of BCBSU1s seven month 
participation in the litigation valuable time and scarce 
resources have been diverted and lost. Such diversions have 
been found prejudicial under circumstances not near so 
compelling as in this case. 
Judge Hanson applied the correct standard of law in 
ruling that BCBSU1s alleged right of arbitration was waived 
because Uninsureds were prejudiced by their active 
participation in litigation. Uninsureds agree with the 
position taken by BCBSU that the majority of federal and 
state courts find waiver of the right to arbitrate if failure 
to demand arbitration brings some prejudice. This rule of 
law was appropriately applied by Judge Hanson to the case at 
hand. 
Because BCBSU is an indispensable party to the 
Uninsureds claims against defendants not bound by the alleged 
arbitration agreement and because BCBSU has made crossclaims 
against these other parties, arbitration will complicate and 
delay rather than simplify and expedite the pending 
litigation. Consequently, justice will best be served by 
permitting the legal action against BCBSU to go forward. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
JUDGE HANSON1S EQUITABLE DETERMINATION THAT THE ACTIVE 
PARTICIPATION OF BCBSU IN LITIGATION CAUSED PREJUDICE TO THE 
UNINSUREDS WAS A FINDING OF FACT AND SHOULD NOT BE DISTURBED 
BY THIS COURT UNLESS CLEARLY AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE 
EVIDENCE. 
Judge Hanson acted in equity when he made factual 
findings that BCBSU actively participated in litigation to 
the extent that the Uninsureds were prejudiced. The 
Arbitration Act gave Judge Hanson the power to determine 
issues surrounding the existence of the alleged right to 
arbitration and to set the alleged agreement aside if grounds 
existed in law or equity. Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-3&4(1) . 
Judge Hanson's memorandum decision never reached 
the question of whether an arbitration agreement even existed 
because he found that prejudice caused to the plaintiffs by 
the BCBSU delay resulted in a waiver of any agreement which 
may have existed. (R. at 709).-
2/ BCBSU1s motion to compel arbitration conceded that no 
arbitration provisions were contained in the parties 
original contracts. BCBSU claimed that it had prepared 
an addendum requiring arbitration which was believed to 
have been sent to a local printer for preparation of 
mailers which were believed to have been sent to a 
direct mail service which was believed to have mailed 
these addendums to all UDA members. Plaintiffs do not 
recall ever receiving this alleged mailer. (R. at 444 
and 521) . 
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The brief of the appellant suggests that Judge 
Hanson's ruling was made solely upon the pleadings. This is 
not correct. Judge Hanson's equitable determination was made 
after carefully reviewing many sources of information 
including the Uninsured's verified complaint and attached 
exhibits, affidavits of each of the eleven Uninsureds and 
attached exhibits, the written contract between BCBSU and the 
Uninsureds, summaries of the deposition testimony of William 
Kidder and Richard West, discovery documents including 
notices of deposition and requests for production of 
documents and interrogatories between the parties, the 
affidavit of BCBSU employee Edwina Howard, and the extensive 
oral argument of counsel for each of the parties. (R. at 409 
and 504). 
Judge Hanson's memorandum decision, which came 
after three months of careful consideration, contains 
findings of fact that should not be disturbed unless clearly 
opposed to the evidence Thomas v. Thomas 569 P.2d 1119, 1121 
(Utah 1977)(memorandum decisions constitute findings of fact 
and law); Keating v. Superior Court of Alameda County, 31 
Cal. 3d 584, 183 Cal. Rpt. 360, 645 P.2d 1192, 1204 (Cal. 
1982)(issue of waiver of the right to arbitrate is one of 
fact); and State In The Interest of KKH, 610 P.2d 849, 851 
(Utah 1980). 
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This Court has previously declared that it will not 
disturb the factual findings of trial courts sitting in 
equity unless the appellant establishes manifest error. 
In equity proceedings we are charged with the 
responsibility of reviewing the evidence, and it is 
the established rule that we will not disturb the 
findings and determination made unless they are 
clearly against the weight of the evidence, or the 
court has abused its discretion. 
State In The Interest of KKHy 610 P.2d 849, 852 (Utah 1980), 
quoting State In The Interest of K B
 f 7 Utah 2d 398, 326 
P.2d 395 (1958). 
This same standard of review was applied by the New 
Mexico Supreme Court in reviewing a trial court's order 
regarding a motion to compel arbitration in United Nuclear 
Corp. v. General Atomic Co., 93 N.M. 105, 597 P.2d 290 
(1979). In that case the New Mexico Supreme Court declared 
that where the trial court ruling is based upon documentary 
evidence or depositions, as in this case, its ruling should 
not be disturbed unless "manifestly wrong or clearly opposed 
to the evidence" Id. at 305, quoting Valdez v. Salazar, 45 
N.M. 107 P.2d 862, 865 (N.M. 1940). See also Price v. Drexel 
Burnham Lambert, Inc., 791 F.2d 1156, 1159 (5th Cir. 
1986)(Ruling that the standard of review in considering 
waiver of the right to arbitrate is "plenary" with regard to 
legal conclusions and "clearly erroneous" with regard to 
factual conclusions.) 
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Judge Hanson's findings of active participation in 
litigation by BCBSU resulting prejudice to the Uninsureds are 
findings of fact made in equity pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
S 78-31a-3. This Court should not disturb those findings 
unless clearly against the weight of the evidence. 
POINT II 
JUDGE HANSON'S FINDING THAT BCBSU'S ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN 
THE LITIGATION PREJUDICED THE UNINSUREDS IS NOT CLEARLY 
AGAINST THE WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. 
Judge Hanson's memorandum decision contains the 
factual finding that BCBSU's active participation in the 
litigation process resulted in substantial prejudice to the 
Uninsureds and other parties. 
This court is satisfied that to allow defendant 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield to stay in the 
proceedings, either in part or in whole pending 
arbitration, would be inappropriate and that the 
involvement in litigation by Blue Cross and Blue 
Shield has been to the extent that arbitration 
would work a substantial prejudice on the remaining 
parties. (R. at 709). 
There is abundant evidence in the record to support 
the finding that BCBSU actively participated in litigation. 
Once it was named as a party, BCBSU (a) failed to assert 
arbitration as an affirmative defense in its answer; (b) 
filed crossclaims against the UDA, Massachusetts Mutual, Gary 
D. Henderson and Steven G. Sholy; (c) raised 17 affirmative 
defenses; (d) designated a Rule 30(b)(6) corporate spokesman; 
(e) responded to and issued interrogatories and requests for 
-14-
production of documents; (f) requested and obtained 
stipulations from the parties to a protective order; and (g) 
participated in five depositions interposing comments, making 
objections and conducting cross-examination. 
In many jurisdictions, testing the judicial waters 
to the extent that Blue Cross has done in this case 
constitutes an automatic waiver of any right to arbitrate. 
No specific showing of prejudice is required. Despoil v. 
Kohlmeyer, 35 N.Y. 2d 402, 362 N.Y.S. 2d 843, 321 N.E. 2d 770 
(1974)(holding that the filing of a crossclaim constitutes 
waiver of a parties right to arbitrate); City of Niagara 
Falls v. Rudolph, 91 A.D. 2d 817, 458 N.Y.S. 2d 97 (N.Y. 
1982)(holding that filing crossclaims and participating in 
discovery for 6 months before filing a motion to compel 
arbitration constitutes waiver of the right to arbitrate). 
Burton-Dixie Corp. v. Timothy McCarthy Const. Co.y 436 F.2d 
405, 408 (5th Cir. 1971)(trial court's finding of waiver 
upheld even though no specific finding of prejudice since the 
sum and substance of the finding was one of prejudice and 
detriment to the party claiming waiver). 
In the present case, Judge Hanson specifically 
found prejudice to the parties resulting from BCBSU's 
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participation in the litigation.- There is ample evidence 
in the record to support his finding. Because of the serious 
illnesses suffered in the families of each of the 11 
Uninsureds, any delay in obtaining insurance coverage or 
damages from which payment for necessary medical care and 
treatment can be obtained is significant. In November of 
1987, when the Uninsureds insurance coverage was terminated 
by BCBSU, Uninsureds or members of their families suffered 
and now suffer from medical conditions requiring expensive 
ongoing medical care and treatment. Because of these 
illnesses it is impossible for Uninsureds to obtain insurance 
coverage for themselves and members of their families 
anywhere comparable to their BCBSU benefits. As a result, 
some Uninsureds face the choice of impoverishment, bankruptcy 
or medical neglect. (R. at 10, 11, 521 & 608). 
As of this date, several of the Uninsureds have no 
insurance benefits to cover serious illnesses such as Julie 
Allen's bipolar depression, Steven Spencer's paraplegia, 
David Richard's paraplegia and adult respiratory distress 
2./ The argument of BCBSU that Judge Hanson's finding of 
prejudice was directed to parties other than the 
Uninsureds is ridiculous. Read in context, Judge 
Hanson's Memorandum Decision clearly finds that if BCBSU 
were permitted to pull out of the litigation after 
having participated in key discovery and after the 
Uninsureds and other parties had prepared to try their 
claims with BCBSU present as a party, the parties 
remaining in litigation would be substantially 
prejudiced. The remaining parties, of course, would 
include everyone but BCBSU. 
-16-
syndrome, and Ruth Ann Olsen's chronic liver disease. Other 
uninsureds, who have been able to obtain some coverage, 
suffer from inadequate benefits, high premiums and a delay or 
outright refusal by their carriers to pay medical bills. 
Under these circumstances, a one week delay of Uninsureds1 
attempts to obtain a remedy is prejudicial. BCBSU1s seven 
month delay in alleging a right to arbitration has cost the 
Uninsureds valuable time, energy and money in pursuing 
discovery against BCBSU, in preparing to try their cases 
against BCBSU and in accommodating BCBSU to discovery 
schedules. 
Valuable time and scarce resources have been 
diverted and lost. Such diversions have been found 
prejudicial under circumstances not near so compelling as in 
this case. In Reid Burton Const. Co. Inc. v. Carpenters 
District Council, 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980) the court 
noted that defendant's delay in asserting its right to 
arbitration to the point that the plaintiffs had spent time 
and money preparing their case caused plaintiffs sufficient 
prejudice to constitute a waiver of the defendant's right to 
compel arbitration. The court emphasized that there was no 
set rule as to what constitutes a waiver or an abandonment of 
the right to arbitrate but that the question depends upon the 
facts of each case and usually calls for a finding by the 
trier of facts. Judge Hanson's finding of prejudice is 
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supported by the unique facts of this case. The New Mexico 
Supreme Court has noted in Wood v. Millers National Insurance 
Company, 96 N.M. 525, 632 P.2d 1163 (1981), that if the party 
moving to compel arbitration causes other parties to believe 
that they do not intend to make a demand for arbitration, 
prejudice results. Courts of other jurisdictions have ruled 
that the mere expense caused by parties1 participation in the 
litigation process can constitute prejudice sufficient for 
waiver. Jones Motor Co. v. Chauffeurs, Teamsters and Helpers 
Local Union No. 633, 671 F.2d 38, 44 (5th Cir. 1982) and 
National Foundation For Cancer Research v. A.G. Edwards & 
Sons, Inc., 821 F.2d 772, 777 (D.C. Cir. 1987). 
BCBSU argues that its substantial involvement in 
discovery should not be counted as waiver. BCBSU argues that 
much of this discovery was initiated by Uninsureds. In Price 
v. Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc. 791 F.2d 1156 (5th Cir. 1986) 
the court rejected the argument that discovery initiated by 
the plaintiff should not be deemed prejudicial. In the 
present case Uninsureds spent a great deal of time, money and 
energy pursuing BCBSU with interrogatories and three requests 
for production of documents. The argument that Uninsureds 
have benefited from this effort is misdirected. If 
arbitration is compelled, the information discovered in 
preparing claims for trial against BCBSU is useless in the 
pending litigation. 
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Waste of the Uninsureds resources as well as the 
benefits which BCBSU has derived from being able to 
participate in discovery have caused prejudice. In Board of 
Education Taos Municipal School v. Architects, 10 N.M. 462, 
709 P.2d 184 (1985), the New Mexico Supreme Court overturned 
a trial court's order compelling arbitration because the 
plaintiffs had been prejudiced by the defendants six month 
participation in discovery before demanding arbitration, even 
though the issue of arbitration had been raised as an 
affirmative defense in the original pleadings. Defendants 
argued on appeal that the plaintiffs had not been prejudiced 
by the delay because they had merely participated in 
discovery, the case was not yet at issue and no hearings had 
been held. Nevertheless, the New Mexico Supreme Court found 
clear prejudice resulting in waiver of the right to arbitrate 
because (a) the plaintiffs had spent time and money involving 
the defendants in the discovery process; (b) the plaintiffs 
had begun preparing their case against the defendants, 
assuming that it would go to trial rather than to 
arbitration; and (c) defendants had benefited from discovery 
not available under arbitration. The court noted that: 
By availing themselves of the equitable procedures 
of discovery Architects [defendants] realized a 
benefit under litigation which would have been lost 
under arbitration. Moreover, as the facts of 
United Nuclear so vividly illustrate, the discovery 
process itself can be a substantial burden, both of 
money and time, before the issues are ever joined 
at trial. Thus, we find that the conduct of 
Architects did induce in Taos [plaintiff] a 
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detrimental reliance on Architects' intent to waive 
arbitration. 
Id. at 186. As a result, defendants were found to have 
"clearly waived the right to demand arbitration". Id. 
In reliance on the failure of BCBSU to demand 
arbitration, Uninsureds spent five months of intense 
discovery and preparation to try their case against all 
defendants in the same proceeding. The approach taken by 
Uninsureds in conducting this discovery, particularly with 
regard to the taking of depositions, would have been 
different if they had known that BCBSU would be compelling 
arbitration. If arbitration is now compelled BCBSU will have 
the advantage of having participated in the depositions of 
four key Massachusetts Mutual witnesses. BCBSU. will be able 
to marshal this testimony in their defense at arbitration 
without bringing any liability upon Massachusetts Mutual. 
Likewise, at trial Massachusetts Mutual will be able to point 
to the deposition testimony of Blue Cross witnesses to excuse 
its actions without bringing any liability upon Blue Cross. 
Had counsel for Uninsureds known that its actions against 
these parties would be separated, the Uninsureds approach in 
taking these depositions would have been entirely different. 
As discovery now stands, both BCBSU and Massachusetts Mutual 
will greatly benefit, to the prejudice of the Uninsureds, if 
arbitration is compelled. 
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In light of the many unique circumstances of this 
case, Judge Hanson1s equitable finding that the Uninsureds 
were prejudiced by BCBSU's active participation in litigation 
is not against the clear weight of the evidence. This 
finding should not be disturbed on appeal. 
POINT III 
JUDGE HANSON'S FINDING THAT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF BCBSU 
CAUSED PREJUDICE TO THE PLAINTIFFS RESULTING IN A WAIVER OF 
THE RIGHT TO ARBITRATE WAS AN APPROPRIATE APPLICATION OF THE 
PROPER STANDARD OF LAW. 
BCBSU urges this Court to adopt the majority 
position of courts throughout the country in finding that a 
waiver of an otherwise enforceable right to arbitrate a 
dispute occurs when a defendant has participated in 
litigation to the prejudice of the opposing party before 
seeking to compel arbitration. BCBSU also asserts that Judge 
Hanson applied an incorrect standard of law in determining 
that BCBSU waived its right to arbitrate its dispute with 
Uninsureds in this matter. Judge Hanson did, however, apply 
the very test that BCBSU urges this Court to adopt. Judge 
Hanson specifically found that BCBSU had actively 
participated in the litigation to the extent that it would 
substantially prejudice the Uninsureds for the court to 
compel arbitration. 
As BCBSU correctly notes, the majority position of 
federal and state courts throughout the country is that 
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waiver of the right to arbitrate will be found when the party 
seeking arbitration invokes the judicial process to the 
detriment or prejudice of the other party. In short, 
prejudice is generally tantamount to waiver. (Appellant 
brief at 18). The relative factors generally considered in 
finding prejudice and waiver were reviewed by the Tenth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in Reid Burton Const. Co. Inc. v. 
Carpenters District Council, 614 F.2d 698 (10th Cir. 1980). 
The court concluded that arbitration may not be enforced by a 
party that has substantially involved itself in the machinery 
of litigation before communicating an attempt to arbitrate. 
The court defined relative factors in making this 
determination as follows a) failure to plead the right to 
arbitration; b) filing a counterclaim without asking for a 
stay; c) participating in discovery; d) delay in seeking a 
stay; e) misleading the opposing party to believe that 
arbitration would not be demanded; f) failing to compel 
arbitration until trial is at hand; and g) prejudicing the 
opposing party by failing to promptly demand arbitration. 
In Reid the defendant pled arbitration as a bar to 
litigation, but also counterclaimed for damages. Eight 
months later, after participating in discovery, the defendant 
filed a "suggestion to dismiss" judicial proceedings because 
of the arbitration agreement. There was further delay in 
bringing a motion to compel. The court found that although 
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federal courts typically favor enforcement of arbitration 
agreements, waiver may be found where the party asserting 
arbitration has "actually participated in the lawsuit or has 
taken other action inconsistent with his right." Id. at 702. 
In Reid, the Tenth Circuit upheld the trial court's finding 
of waiver. The present case contains almost all of the 
relative factors set forth in Reid with additional factual 
exigencies making any delay in obtaining a remedy much more 
prejudicial. While the cases cited in support of the 
appellants brief generally set forth the rule of law applied 
in Reid and by Judge Hanson, they can be distinguished from 
the case at hand in that no prejudice was found. 
In Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co.y 779 F.2d 885 (2d Cir. 
1985) the court conceded that waiver exists if failure to 
timely demand arbitration brings "some resultant prejudice to 
a party". Id. at 887, quoting Carcich v. Rederi A/B Nordie, 
389 F.2d 692, 696 (2d Cir. 1968). In Rush the court found no 
prejudice because the delay in demanding arbitration had been 
caused in part by the district judge's change of heart on the 
issue of punitive damages. The appellate court also forgave 
the defendants participation in discovery because it was 
related to claims of the plaintiffs not covered by 
arbitration. Neither of these excusing circumstances exist 
in the case at hand. 
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In County of Clark v. Blanchard Const, Co., 653 
P.2d 1217 (Nev. 1982) the plaintiff claimed that defendants 
action in merely answering the complaint was waiver. The 
plaintiffs argument that any participation in litigation, 
however slight, was sufficient for waiver was rejected 
because no prejudice had resulted. In the present case 
BCBSU1s involvement was far more extensive and prejudice did 
result. 
In Sibley v. Tandy Corp., 543 F.2d 540 (5th Cir. 
1976) no prejudice was found because the defendants motion to 
compel arbitration was filed on the same day that it answered 
the plaintiff's complaint. 
In Bernalillo City Med. Center Corp. v. Ken 
Cancelosi, 92 N.M. 307, 587 P.2d 960, 962 (N.M. 1978) no 
waiver of the right to arbitrate was found because "nothing 
of consequence occurred to prejudice the plaintiff". 
Contrast these cases cited by BCBSU involving mere 
delay of "no consequence" with the confusion and seven month 
diversion of valuable time and resources involving 11 
families anxious to obtain a remedy so that necessary medical 
care and treatment can be obtained and paid for. 
Under the reasoning of Taos and Reid, supra and the 
cases cited by BCBSU, a trial court may find that a party has 
waived its right to compel arbitration by participating in 
litigation to an extent that causes some prejudice to the 
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other party. Judge Hanson therefore applied the correct test 
when he issued his memorandum decision finding that BCBSU had 
"actively participated in the litigation process" and that 
"involvement in litigation by Blue Cross and Blue Shield has 
been to the extent that arbitration would work a substantial 
3/ prejudice on the remaining parties".— 
POINT IV 
BECAUSE LITIGATION WILL BE COMPLICATED AND DELAYED BY 
ARBITRATION, JUSTICE WILL BEST BE SERVED BY PERMITTING THE 
LEGAL ACTION AGAINST BLUE CROSS TO GO FORWARD. 
BCBSU is an indispensable party in Uninsureds 
claims against Massachusetts Mutual, the UDA and Henderson & 
Sholy. (R. at 750-777). Consequently, arbitration of the 
Uninsureds individual contract claims will complicate and 
delay rather than simplify and expedite the pending 
litigation. Arbitration will not resolve the Uninsureds' 
claims against these other defendants. Nor, will it resolve 
BCBSU1s crossclaims against these same defendants. 
Regardless of what happens at arbitration, both the 
Uninsureds and BCBSU will be back before the trial court to 
2/ BCBSU's assertion that the Federal Arbitration Act 
should preempt state law is without merit. The Federal 
Arbitration Act applies only to written provisions in 
"any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a 
transaction involving commerce". There has been no 
showing that the insurance contracts between the 
plaintiffs and BCBSU fall within the language of the 
Federal Arbitration Act. 
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continue litigating claims against other defendants. Judge 
Hanson's decision to set aside the alleged arbitration 
agreement on equitable grounds will result in the most 
practical and inexpensive resolution of this dispute, as 
desired by the Legislature in enacting Utah's Arbitration 
Act. Unlike the Federal Arbitration Act, Utah's Arbitration 
Act was implemented to provide for the practical and 
inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court 
congestion. 
"The policy of our law favors arbitration as a 
speedy and inexpensive method of adjudicating 
disputes. Giannopulos v. Pappas, 80 Utah at 449, 
15 P.2d at 356. To that end, the Legislature 
amended the Arbitration Act to permit valid and 
enforceable agreements for arbitration of future as 
well as present disputes § 78-31-1. We held that 
amendment constitutional in an opinion that 
reaffirms the strong public policy in favor of 
arbitration as an approved, practical, and 
inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing 
court congestion. 
Robinson & Wells, P.C. v. Warrenf 669 P.2d 844, 846 (Utah 
1983 K"-7 
Under the circumstances of this case, Judge 
Hanson's ruling, requiring that the Uninsureds claims against 
all defendants be litigated in the same proceeding will 
result in a more speedy practical, inexpensive and just means 
of settling the dispute than if arbitration were compelled. 
y Compare to Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885, 
891(2d Cir. 1985) declaring that the primary purpose of 
the Federal Arbitration Act is the enforcement of 
private contracts, not efficiency or judicial economy. 
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CONCLUSION 
Utah Code Ann. S 78-31a-3 granted Judge Hanson the 
authority to set aside the alleged BCBSU arbitration 
agreement upon grounds existing in equity. In light of the 
unique circumstances of this case and the Uninsureds urgent 
need to obtain a remedy to pay for serious uninsured 
illnesses, Judge Hanson's finding that BCBSUfs active 
participation in the litigation caused prejudice is not 
clearly against the weight of the evidence. His order 
finding a waiver of any arbitration agreement which may have 
existed is consistent with the standard of law generally 
applied in both federal and state courts and should not be 
disturbed. 
, ^ 
DATED this J__ day of October, 1990. 
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NOV 1 h 1989 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER, 
et al., 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a 
Massachusetts corporation; 
et al., 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CIVIL NO. C-87-7787 
Before the Court is the Motion of the defendant 
Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company for Summary 
Judgment, and the Motion of Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah 
seeking to compel arbitration and stay proceedings. These 
matters came before the Court for argument. Prior to oral 
argument counsel had extensively briefed their respective 
positions dealing with the aforementioned Motions. At the 
hearing counsel argued their respective positions, and the 
Court took the matter under advisement to further consider the 
legal authorities cited by the parties, and to allow further 
supplementation of legal authorities by counsel. Those 
CHANDLER V. MASS. MUTUAL LIFE PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
supplementations have occurred, the Court has reviewed the 
pre-argument Memoranda submitted by counsel for the parties, 
considered the argument of counsel at the hearing, and has 
reviewed the materials submitted post-hearing. The Court being 
otherwise fully advised, enters the following Memorandum 
Decision. 
Turning first to the Motion of the defendant Massachusetts 
Mutual Life Insurance Company for Summary Judgment against the 
plaintiffs. The defendant seeks Summary Judgment on the basis 
that the Utah Dental Association was a "employee organization" 
under the Employment Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 
(ERISA), and that under ERISA, the plaintiffs' common law tort 
claims are preempted by the federal statute. 
The plaintiffs argue that the Utah Dental Association is 
not a "employee organization,w and accordingly the requirements 
of ERISA are not applicable to this suit. It should be noted 
that the plaintiffs are members of the Utah Dental Association, 
but individually employed dental practitioners or retired 
dental practitioners. The Utah Dental Association, at least on 
the face of the pleadings at this point in time, appears to be 
a professional organization to which the plaintiffs voluntarily 
belong. 
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A review of the authorities submitted by the parties in 
this case lead the Court to the conclusion that the Utah Dental 
Association is not an "employee organization,H and that the 
circumstances of this case do not fall into the appropriate 
statutory definitions to bring the plaintiffs' claims under the 
federal act. As the plaintiffs' claims in this case are not 
governed by ERISA, the state common law claims are not 
preempted. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court determines that the 
defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company's Motion 
for Summary Judgment must be denied. 
Turning next to the Motion to Compel Arbitration of Blue 
Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, the Court is satisfied that the 
Motion to Compel Arbitration of Blue Cross and Blue Shield is 
out of time. A review of the file shows that Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield have extensively participated in the litigation 
since being joined as a party defendant. This Court adopts 
what appears to be the majority position throughout the country 
with regard to active participation of a defendant with a right 
to arbitrate. That is, a defendant who has a right to 
arbitrate (assuming there is a right to arbitrate in this 
case), loses or otherwise waives that right by actively 
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participating in the litigation process. The Court is 
satisfied that to allow defendant Blue Cross and Blue Shield to 
stay the proceedings, either in part or in whole pending 
arbitration, would be inappropriate and that the involvement in 
litigation by Blue Cross and Blue Shield has been to the extent 
that arbitration would work a substantial prejudice on the 
remaining parties. 
Based upon the foregoing, the Court denies Blue Cross and 
Blue Shield's Motion to Compel Arbitration. Having determined 
that the Motion to Compel Arbitration is not well-taken on the 
basis of active participation in the litigation by the movant 
Blue Cross and Blue Shield, the Court declines to address the 
issues raised by the plaintiff as to whether or not there is a 
right to arbitrate on the part of Blue Cross and Blue Shield in 
these proceedings at all. 
Counsel for the plaintiff is to prepare an appropriate 
Order in accordance with this Memorandum Decision, and submit 
the same to the Court pursuant to the Code of Judicial 
Administration. 
Dated this day of November, 1989. 
_/£ 
TIMOTHY R. HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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DR. THOMAS E. CHANDLER; DR. 
MICHAEL E. ALLEN; DR. CLARK 
FULLMER; DR. RODNEY W. 
LIVINGSTON; DR. GARTH L. 
NELSON; DR. GENE M. RICHARDS; 
DR. PHILLIP H. SPENCER; 
CLIVE C. INGRAM; 
DAVID B. HINCKS; 
ALDEAN WASHBURN; and DR. PAUL 
R. OLSEN; individually and on 
behalf of MEMBERS OF THE UTAH 
DENTAL ASSOCIATION, 
Plaintiffs, 
v. 
MASSACHUSETTS MUTUAL LIFE 
INSURANCE COMPANY, a Massacm.^ei t; 
corporation; GARY D. 
HENDERSON; STEVEN G. SHOLV; lhe 
UTAH DENTAL ASSOCIATION, a Utah 
incorporated association; and 
BLUE CROSS AND BLUE SHIELD OF 
UTAH, a Utah corporation. 
ORDER DENYING DEFENDANT 
BLUE CROSS £. BLUE SHIELD 
OF UTAH'S MOTION TO 
COMPEL ARBITRATION AND 
TO STAY PROCEEDINGS 
Civil Ho. 8 7-07787 
Judge 1.mothy R. Hanson 
Defendants. 
Defendant Blue Cross & Blue Shield's Motion to Compel 
Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings came on for hearing on August 
28, 1989, at 2:00 P.M. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Utah was rep-
resented by David R. Money and Timothy C. Houpt. Norman J. 
Younker and Michael L. Chidester appeared on behalf of plain-
tiffs. Also present were Heinz Mahler on behalf of defendants 
Gary D. Henderson and Steven G. Sholy and Karra Porter on behalf 
of defendant Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance Company, Upon 
consideration of the moving papers, the written memoranda, exhib 
its and oral arguments of counsel, and good cause appearing 
therefor, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that 
defendant's Motion to Compel Arbitration and to Stay Proceedings 
is denied. The Court finds that Blue Cross & Blue Shield has 
participated in the litigation since being joined as a party 
defendant to such an extent that any right to arbitration has 
been waived and that arbitration would work a substantial preju-
dice on the remaining parties. 
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DATED this 3/ 
% ^ t 
>~^f day of -NovembM^ 1989, 
'imothy R. Hanson 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT 
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of the record on appeal. 
1. During August of 1988 the deposition of Blue Cross 
and Blue Shield of Utah ("BCBSU") plan administrator, Richard West, 
was taken. 
2. On December 21, 1988, BCBSU participated in the depo-
sition of Lynn Schisser in Springfield, Massachusetts. 
3. On December 21, 1988, BCBSU participated in the depo-
sition of Laura Dieterle in Springfield, Massachusetts. 
4. On December 22, 1988, BCBSU participated in the depo-
sition of Tom Roman in Springfield, Massachusetts. 
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